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Information and communication technologies (ICT) have transformed with the 
advent of the Internet and the diffusion of cellular-based communications. Previous 
research has examined the effects of horizontal ICT on collective violence, but the effects 
on non-violent expressions are not well understood. Using social conflict data from 
Africa and Latin America between 1990 and 2011, this study employs negative binomial 
regression models to explore the distinct effects of the spread of social media on peaceful 
protests within democratic, anocratic, and autocratic regimes. Multiple regression models 
find strong statistical evidence in support of a positive relationship between social media 
and peaceful protest in anocratic regimes. Autocratic and anocratic states will thus 
increasingly find themselves in a social media challenge—repress horizontal ICT or 
embrace it and its effects—as their populations seek democratization. 
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On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian man, Mohamed Bouazizi, lit himself on fire in 
protest against his treatment by an abusive regime.1 Though the event was not covered by 
Tunisian press and was subsequently actively suppressed, it became a watershed moment 
in what many have argued is the beginning of democracy’s fourth wave. In the incipient 
stages of the Arab Spring, many journalists pointed to new media as a catalyst for the 
protests, demonstrations, riots, and general fighting. More nuanced analyses recognize 
the numerous and diverse factors at play contributing to the popular movement that swept 
across North Africa and the Middle East. Viewing the Arab Spring as a mere social 
media phenomenon is reductive, but ignoring the role it and associated technologies 
played is likewise a mistake. This analysis seeks to contextualize the role new media 
plays in collective action in conflict states.  
This research hypothesizes that new media availability is fundamentally changing 
the transaction costs and dynamics of human interaction within the state and region. 
Communication and social interaction have been enabled in ways previously 
unimaginable; consequently, individuals and groups are able to collaborate and organize 
in completely novel ways. This thesis seeks to understand how horizontal information 
and communications technology (ICT), such as cell phones, social media systems, and 
the Internet has impacted a particular mode of collective action. Through quantitative 
analysis, this study examines the relationship between social media penetration and 
peaceful protests within autocratic, anocratic, and democratic regimes. The resultant 
models identify a clear positive relationship between social media and peaceful protest.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the terms social media and horizontal ICT are used 
interchangeably. These terms represent the means by which members of a society can 
collaborate outside of traditional communication methods. For example, organizing and 
communication capabilities that were once limited to landlines or mass media are now 
available to the individual in a single device. A simple cellular phone is now capable of 
                                                 
1 Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the 
Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), PDF. 
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several functions, such as surfing the Internet, visiting social media sites, and calling 
friends and families. These terms seek to encompass the capabilities of this ubiquitous 
technology, distinct from last generation ICTs. 
In the sections that follow, the authors review the relevant literature on collective 
action, peaceful protest, regime types, and ICT. Based on the existing body of 
knowledge, the authors hypothesize—relative to increased social media penetration—
democratic regimes will have decreasing episodes of peaceful protests, autocratic and 
anocratic regimes will experience increased levels of protests, regimes with high rural 
populations will experience greater increases in levels of peaceful protest, and regimes 
with high levels of ethnic fractionalization will experience greater increases in peaceful 
protest. The authors employed a negative binomial, multivariate regression analysis on 
multiple open source datasets to test each hypothesis.   
Ultimately, the research identifies that there is a fundamental association between 
the levels of protest, regime type, and social media among the world’s polities. The 
analysis indicates complex interactive relationships between regime type, social media, 
and other variables. The findings suggest that social media lowers transaction costs, 
facilitates coordination and mobilization, and contributes to a normative effect promoting 
peaceful expressions of collective actions within anocratic regimes. In addition, 
assumptions that ethnic diversity and low rural populations are indicators for high levels 
of protests are challenged, as the opposite effect actually appears to be the case. Based on 
these findings, the authors conclude with possible policy implications and areas for 
further inquiry.  
A better understanding of the social media conditions necessary and sufficient for 
collective action, namely peaceful protest, to emerge within polities will prove beneficial 
to policy makers. A clearer understanding of this phenomenon may assist policy makers 
in identifying and responding to emergent collective activities. As a result, leaders may 
make informed decisions when weighing whether or not to intervene in this issue. In 
addition, the research will add to the growing literature on social media’s effect on 
populations, conflict, and government. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before analyzing empirical data, it is important to understand the key mechanisms 
involved in peaceful protests and varied regime types, as well as the established effects of 
horizontal ICT on other forms of collective action. Though far from exhaustive, this 
chapter provides context; by breaking the problem down into its component parts, it 
becomes possible to comprehend what amounts to a complex system requisite for 
organization and mobilization.  
A. COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Peaceful protest fits into the broader spectrum of collective action. It is impossible 
to completely parse protest from collective action, therefore a basic understanding of 
applicable perspectives on collective action are in order. This conversation will be 
focused around the use of horizontal ICT to facilitate collective action and to overcome 
collective action barriers. Overall, the section summarizes traditional views of collective 
action and suggests that the expanded theory provides more explanatory power in today’s 
technology rich environment. 
Bimber and Flanagin note that the literature in this field includes research on 
“social movements, voting behavior, membership in interest groups, the operations of the 
NATO alliance.”2 According to Olson, collective action requires formal organization and 
communality to succeed in achieving the group’s common goal. In the same vein, he 
asserts that smaller groups are more effective at accomplishing a public good than larger 
groups.3 However, Bimber and Flanagin propose an expanded theory on collective action 
that attempts to cover the technological gap, created from the time of Olson’s publication 
to the present. Specifically, they assert that the ease of Internet access has lowered 
individual transactional costs and facilitated transmitting private concerns over a public 
                                                 
2 Bruce Bimber, Andrew J. Flanagin and Cynthia Stohl, “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the 
Contemporary Media Environment,” Communication Theory 15, no. 4 (2005), 365. 
3 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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network. Of note, they claim, “when that boundary [between private and public] is 
crossed by two or more people in conjunction with a public good, a collective action has 
occurred.”4 The expanded theory builds on previous collective action parameters by 
adding that it is an individual’s conscious decision to cross over from private 
communications to public communications with a goal to further pursue public good and 
influence others that create a new domain for collective action.5 
In essence, this may explain how groups without any coherent organization may 
achieve overarching goals despite traditional communication barriers. The Internet may 
provide the perceived anonymity and forum for individuals to contribute to an overall 
movement without inheriting the dangerous costs of more overt dissention methods. 
Thus, ultimately bringing groups together faster, more focused, and better logistically 
prepared to meet the government when the timing is right. Hence Bimber and Flanigan 
acknowledge that blogs sufficiently demonstrate this crossover from the public to the 
private realm.6 For example, one could start a public blog without an organizational 
following, yet unwittingly they have created a blog that supports a public good, and if the 
government possesses weak institutions or a weak bureaucracy, the blogger may escape 
consequences or perhaps garner a following large enough to begin a larger movement.  
This action would mark the crossover from the private to the public domain as put 
forth by Bimber and Flanagin. As demonstrated, the blogger required neither of the 
previously mentioned tenets to convey his idea to the public, and it is through this 
medium that certain polity types may face obstacles when protesters promote their cause 
through ICT. Bimber and Flanagin’s expanded definition along with Olson’s traditional 
premises provide the collective action account for this thesis, and may explain how social 
media may positively or sometimes negatively influence peaceful protests; a subset of 
collective action.  
                                                 
4 Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, “Reconceptualizing Collective Action,” 377. 
5 Ibid., 365. 
6 Ibid., 381. 
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With the emergence of social media and horizontal communication technologies, 
the collective action landscape has also evolved. As noted by Bimber and Flanagin, their 
theory does not replace Olson’s thoughts on the subject, but it does provide an updated 
perspective on the evolving times in communication and collective action.7 Having 
established a point of departure for collective action the thesis will explore peaceful 
protest more closely in the following section.  
B. PEACEFUL PROTEST 
This section will review the peaceful protest cycle. Understanding the protest 
cycle assists the research with providing relevant implications on how peaceful protest 
may unfold under differing polities. Tarrow notes that viewed holistically, collective 
action emerges from a cycle of protest in which heightened conflict arises “across the 
social system”.8 Protests experience geographic and sectoral diffusion then organize as a 
social movement that attempts to frame new meanings of old ideas. It is the compilation 
of ideas and old definitions that potentially create a volatile mixture. In other words, 
conflict does not emerge, but grows out of the diffusion of ideas and the efforts to 
actively organize a protesting social movement. A case study of Italian collective action 
in the 1960–70s, demonstrates that Italians preferred a peaceful protest strategy for years 
before eventually escalating peaceful protest to more violent forms of collective action.9 
The aforementioned protest cycle lens is useful, but arguably insufficient to 
explain the emergence of protest as a distinct form of collective actions that does not 
ultimately lead to violence. Opp advocates a theory of resource mobilization, which 
posits that movements acquire resources and then mobilize the resources toward 
achieving its objectives. Protest cycles are empowered by political opportunity structures. 
Using these tools and the accumulation of research, Opp offers a definition for collective 
action, “joint [i.e., collective] action of individuals aimed at achieving their goal or goals 
                                                 
7 Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl, “Reconceptualizing Collective Action.” 
8 Sidney Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of 
Contention,” Social Science History 17, no. 02 (1993), 284. 
9 Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action,” 281–307.  
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by influencing decisions of a target.”10 Though useful, this definition is too broad for the 
purposes of this research. 
Previous research into the efficacy of nonviolent resistance movements, by 
Stephan and Chenoweth offers a simple yet comprehensive definition for nonviolent 
collective action, “Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict 
through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of 
violence.”11 Ultimately, their research finds that nonviolent methods are twice as likely to 
succeed at achieving their objectives than are violent ones.   
Peaceful protest may follow a predictable cycle, but it appears to unfold 
differently for each country. For example, during the time span 2011–2013, Libya 
experienced 11, 41, and 48 peaceful protests each year respectively; Egypt’s neighbor, 
however, experienced 40, 206, and 196 during the same years.12 This is important 
because the time encompasses the Arab Spring and highlights the disparity in peaceful 
protest numbers between neighboring countries. By 2013, Egypt would remain relatively 
stable with its military clamping down on the populace, while Libya would fall into 
disarray. Yet, other countries experience different levels of intensity, such as Italy’s 
peaceful protest in the 1960s.13  
C. REGIME TYPES 
This section will discuss the literature covering the different regime types and 
then explore the propensity for different regimes to experience collective action in 
general. This analysis adopts three polity types—autocratic, anocratic, and democratic—
as broad categories all states fall within. Further, the section will demonstrate that 
collective action, specifically collective violence, will manifest itself uniquely under 
different regimes in the following ways: autocratic and democratic regimes will appear to 
                                                 
10 Karl-Dieter Opp, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis (New York: Routledge, 2009), 44. 
11 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 9, doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7. 
12 Idean Salehyan et al., “Social conflict in Africa: A new database.” International Interactions 38, no. 
4 (2012): 503–511. 
13 Tarrow, “Cycles of Collective Action.” 
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be the two most stable types and anocratic regimes will appear the weakest of the three. 
Although the thesis is primarily concerned with peaceful protest, understanding collective 
violence characteristics may provide insight into the limited data on peaceful protest. 
Altogether, the section will serve as a point of departure for the thesis to analyze peaceful 
protest within the different regimes.  
The Polity IV Project measures key indicators within a government, such as the 
constraints on executive control and internal political competition and assigns countries a 
polity score along a 21-point scale that ranges from -10 (autocratic regime) to 10 (fully 
democratic regime).14 These discreet scores are then used to assign states into three sub-
groups: autocracies, anocracies, and democracies.15 Autocratic regimes are those 
governments that suppress their populations voting rights, whose leaders are chosen by a 
select elite, and whose elites and leaders normally experience few institutional constraints 
on their powers.16 In contrast, democratic regimes are those having three interdependent 
elements. The first of these is the population’s access to institutions that allow them to 
express their dissatisfaction or appreciation of policies and leaders. The second element is 
the inherent restraints that the country places on its executive power. In other words, the 
executive branch does not possess the sole power to make decisions without facing 
institutional barriers or consequences. The third characteristic is that the country provides 
guaranteed rights for liberty and freedom to every citizen. Yearly, Polity IV weighs the 
aforementioned criteria to measure a country’s autocratic or democratic score.  
Not every country fits neatly into either a purely autocratic or democratic 
category, as there are countries that fall along a spectrum in between. This thesis places 
these countries into the “anocractic regime” category. Anocratic regimes share both 
characteristics of democratic and autocratic regime qualities; yet do not measure high 
                                                 
14 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, “Polity IV: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2014,” Center for Systemic Peace, last modified 2014, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. 
15 Center for Systematic Peace, “The Polity Project,” Center for Systematic Peace, last modified 2014, 
accessed May 19, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
16 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, “Polity IV.” 
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enough on either scale to be placed into one category exclusively.17 Polity IV performs 
yearly measurements, such that a country may move up or down the autocratic or 
democratic scale, depending on it attributes for the observed year. Placing regimes within 
categories provides a basic understanding of its outward characteristics allowing the 
researchers to categorize regime types for efficient statistical analysis.  
While the Polity IV metric provides neat bins to categorize states, not all regimes 
within a particular bin are the same. Washman et al., characterize authoritarian regimes 
into those run by military leaders, a monarchy, multi-party authoritarianism, one party 
authoritarian, no-party, and finally, hybrids of the aforementioned categories.18 Geddes et 
al. offer a similar breakdown of authoritarian regime types; dominant party, military, 
personalist, monarchic, oligarchic, indirect military and hybrid.19 This approach focuses 
on leadership’s personalities. Alternatively, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland present a 
schema, which is concerned primarily with the leader’s means of succession, binning 
authoritarian regimes into three categories, military, monarchy, and civilian.20   
Democracies also have competing descriptions, characteristics, and typologies. 
Most notable is Lijphart’s breakdown where he describes democracies four distinct 
subtypes namely depoliticized, consociational, centripetal, and centrifugal democracies. 
His categorization primarily focused on the political elite behavior relationship with the 
political culture.21 Schedler asserts democracies must meet the following conditions to 
fulfill the democratic promises; empowerment of its citizens, free supply, free demand, 
                                                 
17 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin Cole, Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance and State 
Fragility (Vienna, VA: Center for Systematic Peace, 2014), 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2014.pdf. 
18 Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius, “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated 
Data in Comparative Perspective,” Contemporary Politics 19, no. 1 (2013), 19–34, 31. 
19 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: 
A New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 02 (2014), 313–331. 
20 José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland, “Democracy and 
Dictatorship Revisited,” Public Choice 143, no. 1–2 (2010), 67–101. 
21 Arend Lijphart, “Typologies of Democratic Systems,” Comparative Political Studies 1, no. 1 
(1968), 3. 
 9
universal inclusion for voting, freedom to express differences without repression, 
integrity, and a certainty that elected officials will remain in office.22 
Though these approaches have their merits, they create data sets that are 
inadequate for broad statistical analysis. For example, the monarchy category under 
Geddes et al. produces a sample size too small to draw any significant correlations. 
Alternatively, as in the case with Schedler’s descriptions, the characteristics are too vague 
and require that the research of each polity to determine if it is in fact democratic before 
continuing with a statistical analysis. In contrast, the Polity IV database includes all 
regime types and their subcategories that fall within the authoritarian, anocratic, and 
democratic bins, creating a population adequately scoped to measure significant 
statistical effects. More importantly, Polity IV takes into account the key elements that 
the thesis hypothesizes will be crucial to patterns of violence and peaceful conflict. 
Within the collective violence literature, scholars have traditionally attributed 
fundamental characteristics to the three regime categories. Hegre has demonstrated that 
when the three polities are viewed as a graph, violence within regimes depicts an inverse 
“U”, with democratic and authoritarian regimes anchoring the ends and the intermediate 
regimes or transitioning regimes carrying the burden of instability and conflict.23 In a 
similar vein, Henderson identifies democracies, as resilient institutions that repress its 
population the least of all other regime types.24 Moving to authoritarian regimes, Kalathil 
and Boas demonstrate that authoritarian regimes reserve a capability to effectively 
oppress their populations’ access to media, thus stifling its dissenters from spreading 
infectious ideologies through ICT.25 Furthermore, Regan and Henderson indicate that 
intermediate, anocratic regimes tend to oppress populations to overcome inherently weak 
                                                 
22 Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002), 36–50. 
23 Håvard Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil 
War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 
http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/PS439G/readings/hegre_et_al_2001.pdf. 
24 Conway W. Henderson, “Conditions Affecting the use of Political Repression,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 35, no. 1 (1991), 120–142. 
25 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, “The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: 
China, Cuba and the Counterrevolution,” First Monday 6, no. 8 (2001). 
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government institutions, thus leading to more internal strife as the population recognizes 
an opportunity to achieve its goals in the face of a perceived weaker government.26  
These same intermediate regimes, Vreeland argues, “allow dissidents to organize, 
but nonviolent collective action may be too restricted to be effective. In this context, 
violence is more likely to be seen as the most effective recourse for dissidents, and the 
state reacts with violence accordingly.”27 Pierskalla calls this phenomenon the “murder in 
the middle” concept.28 When faced with an option these same regimes may lean toward 
compromise as a means to assuage their populations. Therefore, given the cumulative 
research, the authors expect to see higher numbers of protest within anocractic regimes. 
D. HORIZONTAL ICT 
Incidents, such as the Arab Spring, suggest that ICT is playing an ever-increasing 
role in world politics and therefore its effects warrant further investigation. This section 
will outline the research concerning horizontal ICT’s influence on contentious collective 
action and question whether horizontal ICT has the capability to fundamentally change 
the societal landscape. The section will present compelling evidence that horizontal ICT 
has the potential to lower transaction costs among the population and possibly increase 
protestors’ ability to facilitate coordination in the face of an oppressive government.  
Warren posits that mass media has a normative effect on the population, 
discouraging large-scale civil violence.29 There is, however a distinct difference between 
“receive only” mass media systems and the “two way communication” of new media 
systems such as cell phones and the Internet. These new horizontal ICTs will have 
differing effects on mobilization than did their predecessors. Though, as Little points out, 
                                                 
26 Patrick M. Regan and Errol A. Henderson, “Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in 
Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2002), 
119–136. 
27 James Raymond Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War Unpacking Anocracy,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3, 2008, 402. 
28 Jan Henryk Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government 
Repression,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 10, 2009, doi:10.1177/0022002709352462. 
29 T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State 
Sovereignty,” International Organization 68: doi:10.1017/S0020818313000350. 
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publication of anti-regime sentiment via ICT has not, to date, demonstrated a definitive 
causal relationship.30  
The role of ICT in collective violence and conflict is the topic of great debate 
especially in the context of modern conflicts such as the Arab Spring of 2011. Empirical 
evidence is contradictory on the role of cell phone technology on anti-regime action. 
Research in Africa finds direct correlations between ICT and collective violence, 
suggesting a positive relationship,31 though scholars are uncertain whether ICT reduces 
makes collective violence easier to coordinate or if it has a normative effect on the 
“economies of scale in the marketplace of ideas.”32 However, a similar study by Shapiro 
and Weidmann, in occupied Iraq, finds that diffusion of ICT actually prevents such 
activity, though it is possible that USG counterinsurgency efforts have skewed the data 
toward non-violence.33 
Little argues that horizontal ICT’s effect on collective action lowers transaction 
costs, increases logistical coordination, and may in fact facilitate organized dissention 
against a regime.34 For example, Aday et al. and Zhuo et al. claim that social media 
played an important role in the Arab Spring.35 Specifically in the 2011 Egyptian Revolt, 
horizontal ICT “intertwined with the development of formal organizations, informal 
networks, and external linkages provoking a growing sense of modernity and community, 
                                                 
30 Andrew T. Little, “Communication Technology and Protest” (working paper, Department of 
Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, January 2015). 
31 Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of 
Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review, May 2013, 
doi:10.1017/S0003055413000075. 
32 T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of 
Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3: 
doi:10.1177/0022343314558102. 
33 Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann, “Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword?: Cell Phones and 
Insurgent Violence in Iraq” (working paper, Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School, 
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, October 28, 2013), http://wws.princeton.edu/faculty-
research/research/item/phone-mightier-sword-cell-phones-and-insurgent-violence-iraq. 
34 Little, “Communication Technology and Protest.” 
35 Sean Aday et al., Blogs and Bullets: New Media in Contentious Politics, report no. 65 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pw65.pdf and Xiaolin 
Zhuo, Barry Wellman and Justine Yu, “Egypt: The First Internet Revolt?” Peace Magazine 27, no. 3 
(2011), 6–10. 
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and globalizing support for the revolt.”36 Critics of the positive effects of ICT on 
collective action mobilization, suggest that the use of these ICTs only exists to the extent 
that the regime allows. They argue that the regime can limit access to systems or use 
them to monitor, track, and even eliminate dissidents or otherwise disaffected 
individuals.37 Indeed, this critique may hold true for the Egyptian revolt in particular; 
however, the widespread reach of the Arab Spring into other Arab nations may 
demonstrate new media’s positive influence on political unrest. 
On the contrary, Rod and Weidmann are skeptical of the Internet’s ability to 
fundamentally change societal landscape. Their research posits that the Internet does not 
have the revolutionary power to usher forward liberty or democracy, as is often claimed. 
While acknowledging that the Internet unifies, they assert that strong authoritarian 
regimes use the Internet’s power to further their objectives and stifle dissidents; the 
Internet is repressive when applied in this manner.38 To illustrate this point further, 
Groshek exemplifies how China employs numerous techniques, such as its “Great 
Firewall” and government-employed Internet police, to filter Internet users’ content. 
China’s restrictions demonstrate how strong authoritarian regimes can effectively control 
their populations’ Internet access. Despite China’s restrictive communication policies, its 
population has found methods to bypass security measures.39 Milner furthers this line of 
argument, stating that authoritative governments adopt Internet less readily than their 
democratic counterparts, thus retarding potential for democratic growth.40 Groshek’s 
example also demonstrates that populations under strict regimes can bypass restrictions, 
thus providing a small opportunity for individuals to spread their ideas.  
                                                 
36 Zhuo, Wellman, and Yu, “Egypt: The First Internet Revolt?” 9. 
37 Anita R. Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network Disruptions and Violence in Civil Conflict,” Journal 
of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): doi:10.1177/0022343314551398 and Chris Edmond, “Information 
Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change,” Review of Economic Studies 80 (July 4, 2013): 
doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020. 
38 Espen Geelmuyden Rød and Nils B. Weidmann, “Empowering Activists Or Autocrats? the Internet 
in Authoritarian Regimes,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015), 338–351. 
39 Jacob Groshek, “The Democratic Effects of the Internet, 1994—2003 A Cross-National Inquiry of 
152 Countries,” International Communication Gazette 71, no. 3 (2009), 115–136. 
40 Helen V. Milner, “The Digital Divide the Role of Political Institutions in Technology Diffusion,” 
Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 2 (2006), 176–199. 
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Some may question if a causal relationship exists at all between horizontal ICT 
and collective action mobilization; perhaps participants and observers merely reported it 
with greater frequency given the horizontal and immediate nature of new ICTs. The 
criticism is fair; however, Comunello and Anzera advise it is imprudent to assume 
previous relationships between old ICTs hold identically with new ICTs.41 Nonetheless, 
Zhuo et al. assert that horizontal ICT served an important role in the Arab Spring. 
According to their research, technology allowed otherwise silent dissenters an 
opportunity to coalesce around a common grievance and to organize grievances into 
large-scale protests against an authoritative government.42  
Thus, a digital revolution quickly engulfed the region rapidly spreading images of 
Tunisia’s protest throughout the rest of North Africa. Additionally, they claim that 
the news outlets almost constant coverage, social media user’s effectiveness with 
organizing times and locations for gatherings, and cellphones subscribers providing 
constant updates to the outside world contributed to the Arab’s Spring fiery escalation.43 
Researchers of the Arab Spring argue ICTs integral role, yet they provide limited hard 
data in their research and rely more on personal testimony and anecdotal evidence.  
Despite this limitation, the literature suggests regimes will experience similar 
outcomes with the increased spread of horizontal ICT. Tufecki and Wilson point out that 
ICT increases the population’s ability to address dissatisfaction with the regime.44 As a 
populations’ access to ICT increases, governments with the least institutional capacity 
may experience the most disruption. Well-established authoritarian and democratic 
regimes may appear more resilient to ICT challenges, while anocratic or intermediate 
regimes may be more susceptible to disruptive influences. 
 
                                                 
41 Francesca Comunello and Giuseppe Anzera, “Will the Revolution Be Tweeted? A Conceptual 
Framework for Understanding the Social Media and the Arab Spring,” Islam and Christian–Muslim 
Relations 23, no. 4: doi:10.1080/09596410.2012.712435. 
42 Zhuo, Wellman and Yu, “Egypt: The First Internet Revolt?” 
43 Ibid. 
44 Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political 
Protest: Observations from Tahrir Square,” Journal of Communication 62, no. 2 (2012), 363–379. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DATA 
The following hypotheses are based on the authors’ understanding of the 
preceding literature and. They were tested through the multivariate regression analysis 
described within the methodology section using existing published datasets. 
A. HYPOTHESES 
H1: Autocratic regimes will experience higher numbers of peaceful protests as 
the level of social media penetration increases. 
The first hypothesis challenges the authoritarian regime’s capability to effectively 
oppress a populace who has access to horizontal ICT and the ability to organize protest. 
Under authoritarian regimes, citizens have little recourse available to challenge the 
government’s policies. All collective action is relatively difficult to coordinate, especially 
under authoritarian regimes that limit free association and modes of speech. As 
mentioned previously, horizontal ICT facilitates logistical coordination for movements 
and speeds the spread of the underlying ideas that these movements form around. 
Historically, some regimes have attempted to institute targeted or widespread 
social media blackouts as a strategy to stymie movements. Egypt’s and Libya’s Internet 
blackout in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring is an ideal example of how authoritarian 
governments can oppress their populations.45 This strategy, however, is fundamentally 
flawed, as the proverbial genie cannot be put back in the bottle.46 Dunn notes that such 
censorship actions serve to undermine regime legitimacy in the eyes of the population 
and exacerbate the grievances the peaceful protest form around in the first place, while 
potentially creating disaffected regime supporters. Consequently, a country may even 
face international backlash in the wake of censoring media. Countrywide censorship 
                                                 
45 Alexandra Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy during Egypt’s January 25 Uprising,” 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35 (2011): 15. 
46 Gohdes, “Pulling the Plug: Network,” 5 and Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption and 
Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence From Mubarak’s Quasi-Experiment,” Political Communication 31, no. 1 
(2014): 7, doi:10.1080/10584609.2012.737439. 
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targets the entire population regardless if they support, dissent, or are indifferent toward 
the government.  
All regimes are motivated, to some extent, by their own self-preservation; 
however, authoritarian regimes are less constrained, than democratic ones, to use 
violence to quell the previously peaceful protest. Also strong authoritarian regimes must 
maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their populations but are not accountable at the ballot 
box, thus are more open to using violence as a means to control their populace.  
H2: Anocratic regimes will experience higher levels of peaceful protest as the 
level of social media penetration increases.  
The thesis’ second hypothesis concerns anocratic regimes’ propensity for peaceful 
protest as its social media user rates rise. Anocratic regimes, or intermediate regimes, 
display both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. The leaders in these regimes are 
often holding onto power by a string, and the population may recognize this. Anocratic 
leaders may hold significant perceived power, yet their ability to wield it is limited by the 
weaknesses of their institutions. Thus, intermediate regimes may be more sensitive to 
higher levels of social media penetration. The aforementioned research suggests that 
these regimes are less stable and lack the political and security infrastructure as compared 
to their authoritarian and democratic counterparts. Therefore, anocratic regimes should 
have increased levels of protest organization as their social media index rises.  
H3: Democratic states will experience a decrease in peaceful protests as the 
level of social media penetration increases. 
The third hypothesis explores the idea that democracies have established 
institutions capable of answering the demands of its citizens; therefore, they will 
experience fewer protests. In democracies, citizens have political recourse to redress 
grievances. Peaceful protest is one of the tools available to the populace, but is secondary 
to achieving their desired changes at the ballot box. The researchers’ initial descriptive 
statistics show that democracies typically have higher social media users, which may 
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positively correlate, as Khazaeli and Stockemer suggests, with good governance.47 
Additionally, as a medium to share and spread ideas and coordinate logistics, Tufekci and 
Wilson claim that social media enables movements to challenge the status quo in 
admittedly new ways, but that do not undermine the authority of democratic regimes.48 
The authors believe the rate of peaceful protests, as a function of ICT availability, will 
decrease within democratic regimes. This implies that as ICT penetration increases within 
democratic regimes, the states existing infrastructure will be more responsive to its 
populaces grievances, thus decreasing its citizen’s requirement to openly protest against 
the government.  
H4: Regimes with more rural populations will experience greater increases in 
levels of peaceful protest as social media penetration increases.  
The fourth hypothesis explores the differences between rural and urban 
populations. It is likely that rural populations, physically removed from seats of 
government and condensed populations, have reduced access to mass media 
infrastructure. They are therefore somewhat insulated from the normative effects of mass 
media. Horizontal ICT systems, however, bring rural populations into communications 
parity with previous centers of gravity in the market place of ideas. This empowerment is 
particularly poignant, because this is a segment in society that heretofore was almost 
entirely disenfranchised. Bylsma and Colby’s research indicated a negative relationship 
between rural populations and civil conflict onset.49 However, this research challenges 
their finding and posits that rural populations will experience greater levels of peaceful 
protest 
                                                 
47 Susan Khazaeli and Daniel Stockemer, “The Internet: A New Route to Good Governance,” 
International Political Science Review 34, no. 5 (2013), 463–482. 
48 Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate.” 
49 Colin D. Bylsma and Samuel T. Colby, “New Challenges to Authoritarian State Stability: The 
Proliferation of Modern Information Communications Technology” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2015). 
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H5: Regimes with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization will experience 
greater increases in levels of peaceful protest as social media penetration 
increases.  
The fifth hypothesis joins the debate on ethnic division’s role in social conflict 
and political regime stability. On one hand, Cederman and Girardin and Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol suggest that ethnic fractionalization contributes to civil violence.50 
Although this group may differ on research approaches and variable selection, its 
overarching message is that ethnic divisions are positively correlated with civil violence. 
On the other hand, Fearon and Laitin point in the opposite direction, suggesting that 
ethnic fractionalization plays an insignificant role in contributing to civil violence.51 
However, the two bodies of research largely ignore social media’s influence. This study 
leans on the preexisting literature to test two conflicting premises of social unrest to help 
develop a deeper understanding of social media’s ability to overcome the collective 
action barrier within ethnically diverse polities.  
B. METHODOLOGICAL STEPS 
This thesis begins with a unit of analysis at the country-year level. By choosing 
this level of analysis, the study avoids systematic difference within countries, such as the 
level of Internet penetration between rural and urban sections, and instead focuses on 
overarching trends across polities and within each polity over time. Despite the study’s 
focus on country-level analysis, the research team took measures to control for 
fundamental differences amongst functioning polities, which the authors will describe in 
the following paragraphs. 
1. Analytical Time Period 
To systematically analyze horizontal ICT within authoritarian regimes, the study 
limits observations to the years 1990–2011 and covers observation from over 60 
                                                 
50 Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity Onto 
Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 01 (2007), 173–185.; Jose Garcia-
Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars,” Potential 
Conflict, and Civil Wars (July 2004). 
51 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 01 (2003), 75–90. 
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countries. The time span represents a period when intermediate and authoritarian 
regime’s populations experienced a rapid growth in horizontal ICT access and use as 
compared to its democratic counterparts. Figure 1 depicts country’s social media users 
growth within autocratic, democratic, and anocratic regimes and its rapid expansion 
during the 1990s. The blue line represents the yearly mean level of social media within 
democracies. The green line depicts the yearly mean level of social media within 
autocracies, and finally the red line depicts the yearly mean level of social media within 
anocracies. Of note, all three-regime types experience rapid social media growth, 
however, democracy’s social media increases faster than its counterparts and remains 
ahead throughout to the end of the observed period. Interestingly, autocracies and 
anocracies expand at similar rates until autocracies experiences a drop in social media in 
2011, which may coincide with wide spread regime change associated with the Arab 
Spring movement.  
 
Figure 1.  Social Media Growth within Autocratic, Democratic, and Anocratic 
Regimes 
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2. Choosing and Defining the Variables 
As previously mentioned, the purpose of this study is to glean important insights 
into overall regime susceptibility to peaceful protest as social media penetrates 
throughout its society. More specifically, it seeks to bring clarity to the often-debated 
relevance of horizontal ICT’s effect within authoritarian regimes and to shed light on 
common ICT/peaceful protest trends. Consequently, the analysis pulls from reputable 
databases and scholarly work to build its models that the authors will use to rigorously 
test their hypotheses. As we discuss below, the study has identified a primary dependent 
variable, independent variable, and several control variables. 
a. Dependent Variable—Peaceful Protest Count 
The study’s dependent variable is the count of peaceful protests. The authors’ 
peaceful protest definition is in line with the Social Conflict in Analysis Database 
(SCAD) categories.52 SCAD observes protests events within African countries and select 
Latin America and Caribbean countries from 1990–2014. SCAD divides its recorded 
social events into 10 categories. Six of the ten categories consist of protests with recorded 
acts of violence while the remaining four record only peaceful protests. As the study is 
mainly concerned with peaceful protest events, the researchers use the following 
categories from the SCAD data to define the peaceful protest variable: organized 
demonstrations, spontaneous demonstrations, general strikes, and limited strikes. 
Following along the collective action line of argument, the peaceful protest events 
include both large and small demonstrations with the number of protestors ranging from 
less than 10 to over 1,000,000.  
b. Independent Variable—The Social Media Index 
The primary independent variable under scrutiny is the level of horizontal ICT 
adoption amongst the world’s polities. There are several sources from which to gather 
media data, such as the International Telecommunication Union database, cellular tower 
                                                 
52 Idean Salehyan and Cullen Hendrix, Social Conflict in Analysis Database Version 3.1 (Austin, TX: 
Strauss Center, 2014), https://www.strausscenter.org/codebooks/SCAD%203.1%20Codebook.pdf. 
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geo-locations, and databases that determine mass media availability.53 However, this 
research borrows from previous research that combines the World Bank’s, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), Internet access and cellular phone access rates to create a 
corresponding logarithmic Social Media Index (SMI) for each polity under scrutiny. In 
other words, per capita cellular access plus per capita Internet access equals the SMI. 
Bylsma and Colby then transform the SMI into a logarithmic expression in order to 
account for the variable’s heavy upper tail.54 
 
SMI provides an approximation of horizontal ICT within a given polity. The 
previous body of research resembles this study’s unit of analysis. Additionally, WDI is an 
open source database with easily accessible data that researchers who are interested in 
replicating these results can quickly access.55 Alternate approaches might exploit social 
media scraping or the use of other metrics such as spatial data on Internet routers and 
cellular towers. These approaches would invariably be useful in research that focuses on 
units of analysis lower than the country level, but that lays beyond the scope of the 
current study.  
c. Control Variables 
To ensure that the analysis considers additional factors, which may affect peaceful 
protest, the study includes control variables common to the study of social conflict. 
Intuitively, one may argue that high ethnic fractionalization may be a consistent 
predictor in determining a population’s propensity towards internal violence or protest. 
Indeed, previous studies have suggested that ethnic fractionalization, while not the 
strongest predictor, contributes to civil unrest.56 Yet, Warren asserts that ethnic 
fractionalization, within countries with mass media access, does not significantly 
                                                 
53 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone.”  
54 Bylsma and Colby, “New Challenges to Authoritarian State Stability.” 
55 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” last modified February 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
56 Tanja Ellingsen, “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic 
Conflict during and after the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000), 228–249. 
SMI  log(Cell  Internet)
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contribute to civil unrest.57 Likewise, Fearon and Laitin assert that when controlled for 
per capita income, ethnic fractionalization does not significantly contribute to civil 
violence.58 This study employs Sambanis’ civil war database to control for ethnic 
fractionalization. This data set measures the percentage of ethnic fractionalization within 
each polity under scrutiny.59  
In order to capture population and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, this 
thesis employs the WDI database from the World Bank. Both variables exhibited heavy 
tailed distributions. Consequently, they are logarithmically transformed to represent a 
more normal distribution, enabling meaningful results when incorporated into the 
negative binomial regression model. This study also accounts for rural population 
percentages, also located within the WDI database.   
One may interpret that media restriction, freedom will affect a population’s ability 
to organize, or that authoritarian regimes will stifle dissent too quickly for protest to 
manifest. Kalathil, a proponent of this argument, posits that authoritarian regimes have 
effectively censored their population’s ICT as in the case with Cuba.60 One would expect 
a noticeable decrease in peaceful protest relative to the level of restriction within 
authoritarian regimes, regardless of the levels of SMI. In order to account for media 
freedom, this study employs the Freedom House Index to measure the degree to which 
mass media is restricted within each polity.61 The index depicts free press scores for 
countries from 1989 to 2011; however, for the periods 1989 to 1993 only qualitative 
scores are available, while for 1993 forward the database includes quantitative measures. 
To reconcile, each qualitative measure was assigned an approximation of its quantitative 
equivalent, and for countries that had gaps in coverage, the previous year’s value was 
                                                 
57 Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 111–141. 
58 Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 75–90 
59 Nicholas Sambanis, “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational 
Definition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), 814–858.  
60 Kalathil and Boas, “The Internet and State Control.” 
61 Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press Index,” The Media Map Project, accessed April 30, 2016, 
http://www.mediamapresource.org/the-data/#. 
 23
moved forward.62 Although the data represents mass media freedom, this study assumes 
the value is a fair approximation of a country’s will to provide its groups or individuals 
free or restricted access to ICT. Comparable measurements of Internet freedom were 
incomplete or failed to fall within this analysis’ observed periods. Using a binary 
measurement, this study divides media restriction into two categories of press restriction, 
restricted (1) or unrestricted (0), with countries that restrict their population’s media 
access belonging to the former and those with free access belonging to the latter.  
d. Regime Classification 
Since this study’s primary focus is regime type, it employs the Center for 
Systemic Peace’s, Polity IV score, to categorize these regimes.63 As previously noted, 
Polity IV is composed of a 21-point system. Because the primary research question 
focused on authoritarian regimes, the 21-point system was simplified into three 
categories: democracy, autocracy, and anocracy. Each qualitative value was created as a 
dummy variable and corresponding qualitative values were assigned autocracy (n = 254) 
≤ -6, anocracy (n = 636) ≥ -5 and ≤ 5, and democracy (n = 518) ≥ 6, based on the Center 
for Systematic Peace metric.64 Additionally, each state’s Polity value is included as a 
linear control variable, democratization score. 
3. Regression Model 
The negative binomial regression model was chosen for this study, because the 
dependent variable, peaceful protest, is a count variable with considerable over-
dispersion. Furthermore, the variance amongst SMI adoption rates varies as countries 
adopted ICTs at differing rates throughout the years. The negative binomial regression 
accounts for the dispersion within the dependent variable allowing the regression model 
to predict results that are in line with the dependent variable and control variable’s 
observed patterns. The regression model and corresponding figures and tables contained 
                                                 
62 Authors note: The researchers categorized values equal to or greater than seventy as restricted. The 
researchers assigned restricted media a 1 and unrestricted media a 0. For qualitative measurements, if the 
measurement was partly free or restricted, the researchers assigned the variable a 1 for restricted.  
63 Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, “Polity IV,” Center for Systematic Peace. 
64 Center for Systematic Peace, “The Polity Project,” Center for Systematic Peace. 
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within this study are derived from the aforementioned datasets and the authors’ original 
analysis using the R programing language and software environment.  
4. ICT and Regime Types 
Because this study intends to explore the effect SMI within particular polities has 
on protest events, an interaction term was chosen rather than a purely additive model. The 
analysis will focus on three polity types: autocracies, anocracies, and democracies. 
Additionally, the regression models have been developed to analyze the interaction 
between SMI and anocracy; SMI and autocracy; and, SMI and democracy. For example, 
each country score ≤ -6 on the polity scale is placed into the autocracy category and is 
assigned a binary score of one, while its counterparts received a zero. Once assigned, the 
target polity group is multiplied with its corresponding SMI score. The researchers repeat 
this method with the remaining polity categories.  
By creating interaction variables, the study assumes that the SMI and regime type 
relationship are interactive as opposed to purely additive. In other words, peaceful protest 
may be dependent on the interaction between the regime type and SMI penetration, as 
proposed in Hypotheses 1–3. This suggests that SMI may have a more complex 
relationship with our dependent variable, than has been recognized in previous research. 
Similarly, to test for the possibility of interactive effects with rural populations and 
ethnic divisions, as proposed in Hypotheses 4 and 5, we include multiplicative interaction 
terms between SMI and rural population, and between SMI and ethnic fractionalization  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
The relationship between peaceful protest events and the SMI, given by the 
bivariate regression depicted in Figure 2, tells an intuitive story that appears to support 
the underlying assumptions at the core of this research: there is in fact a strong positive 
relationship between SMI and protests. The blue line shows the expected number of 
protests in a given country-year, at varying levels of SMI, while the gray bands show 
95% confidence intervals for the expected values. Figure 2 demonstrates that, in the 
aggregate, as a state’s SMI capacity increases, so, too, does the occurrence of protest 
events. These findings support notions that horizontal ICT is in fact a catalyst for change, 
with an average of over two protests at the low end of SMI capacity, nearly quadrupling 
to over seven protests at the opposite extreme. The subsequent models presented in this 
study control for GDP and other variables such as population size and demographic 
concerns in order to further isolate the effects of SMI and political regime types.  
 
Figure 2.  Peaceful Protests as a Function of the Social Media Index 
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A. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION MODELS 
In the previous discussion, this thesis hypothesized that SMI would exacerbate 
protests in autocracies, that it would have a negative effects on democracies, and it would 
increase protests results in anocracies. The researchers further hypothesized that these 
effects would be stronger in the presence of rural populations and ethnic 





Table 1.   Regression, Dependent Variable—Peaceful Protest Count65 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
SMI  0.119*** 0.176*** 0.034 0.497*** 
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.109) 
      
GDP 0.261** 0.183* 0.337*** 0.360*** 0.294*** 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
      
Population 1.299*** 1.238*** 1.212*** 1.207*** 1.208*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
      
Ethnic -0.541*** -0.464*** -0.481*** -0.488*** -0.445*** 
Fractionalization (0.127) (0.126) (0.129) (0.128) (0.130) 
      
Rural -0.006** -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Population (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Press 0.428*** 0.406*** 0.269** 0.304*** 0.444*** 
Restrictions (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.126) 
      
Democratization -0.002 -0.009 0.038*** 0.002 0.035** 
Score (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) 
      
Autocracy   0.035  0.028 
   (0.142)  (0.141) 
      
Democracy   -0.675***  -0.532*** 
   (0.146)  (0.147) 
      
SMI *     -0.215*** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.077) 
      
SMI *     0.001 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
SMI *     -0.280*** 
Press Rest     (0.073) 
      
SMI *   -0.068  -0.087 
Autocracy   (0.054)  (0.055) 
      
SMI *   -0.164***  -0.295*** 
Democracy   (0.047)  (0.057) 
      
Anocracy    0.360***  
    (0.079)  
      
SMI *    0.136***  
Anocracy    (0.041)  
      
Constant -8.264*** -7.752*** -7.894*** -8.306*** -7.893*** 
 (0.718) (0.715) (0.710) (0.710) (0.705) 
      
 
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Log Likelihood -3,213.621 -3,199.647 -3,179.034 -3,184.112 -3,168.749 
theta 0.831*** (0.043) 0.857*** (0.045) 0.899*** (0.047) 0.891*** (0.047) 0.920*** (0.049) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,441.242 6,415.293 6,382.067 6,388.225 6,367.497 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
65 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Model 1 presents the control variables GDP, population, ethnic fractionalization, 
rural population, press restrictions, and democratization score. The protest inducing 
effect of GDP, population and press restrictions are all positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) while ethnic fractionalization and rural population are negative 
and statistically significant (p < 0.05). Model 2 builds on the previous iteration with the 
addition of the independent variable, SMI, which is both positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). The control variables, GDP, population, and press restrictions all 
remain positive and statistically significant (p < 0.1). Model 3 builds further with the 
inclusion of an interaction term between SMI and the polity types autocracy and 
democracy. The protest inducing effect of SMI on democracy is negative and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). 
Because of the limitations imposed by the “dummy” variable used to characterize 
regime types, Model 4 replaces autocracy and democracy with a binary distinction 
between anocracy and all other polity types. The apparent protest inducing effect of SMI 
on anocracies is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05). The sign and significance 
of GDP, population, ethnic fractionalization, and press restrictions remain unchanged 
from Model 3 to Model 4. Figure 3 depicts the interaction between SMI and regime type, 
identified in Model 4, showing the predicted count of protests based at corresponding 




Figure 3.  Peaceful Protests within Anocracies and Democracies as a Function 
of the Social Media Index (Model 3) 
The blue line in Figure 3 represents the predicted count of protests within 
democracies at the corresponding value for SMI. A 95% confidence interval for that 
predicted count is shown with the blue shaded region. At low levels of SMI, democracies 
experience two protests annually, which remains static across the SMI spectrum. This 
refutes H3, which predicted that democratic states would experience a decrease in 
peaceful protests as the level of social media penetration increases. Similarly, the red line 
denotes the predicted count of protests within anocracies at each value of SMI. The 95% 
confidence interval is illustrated with the red shaded area. Anocratic regimes experience 
fewer than three protests a year initially and more than doubles to approximately six at 
the upper limits of the SMI. This finding directly supports H2, which predicted that 
anocratic regimes would experience increasing levels of peaceful protest as social media 
penetration increases. Given the incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic tendencies 
inherent to anocracy, it seems that these regimes lack the systems to effectively respond 
to their populations’ grievances in a meaningful way.66 
                                                 
66 Marshall and Cole, Global Report 2014, Center for Systematic Peace. 
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According to our results, anocracy, more than any other polity, is associated with 
increased protest, especially when faced with higher levels of social media penetration. 
Populations within anocractic regimes are difficult to generalize because of the diversity 
of polities that lead to that classification. However, taken together anocratic regimes have 
weak political, social, and bureaucratic institutions and civil societies. The reduced 
transaction costs offered by SMI in such settings prove incredibly efficacious in 
mobilizing the population in ways the regime has little experience dealing with and for 
which it possesses no effective response mechanism. Alternatively, the presence of SMI 
appears to have a negligible effect on the occurrence of protests within democratic states. 
The virtual space represented by SMI appears to give citizens within democracies an 
outlet to express themselves without needing to mobilize and protest.   
The interaction between SMI and polity is undoubtedly not a phenomenon unto 
itself. SMI does not exist in society in isolation; it permeates, fundamentally altering the 
status quo. Simply put, horizontal ICT is not self-contained; it may also, therefore, be 
conditioned by some of the control variables contained within this study. Model 5 
therefore shows a regression model that modifies Model 3 to takes into account the 
interaction at play between SMI and ethnic fractionalization, rural population, press 
restrictions, and the three regime types.  
The significance and direction of coefficients for the control variables are 
effectively unchanged between Models 3 and 5. The new interactions between SMI and 
the variables ethnic fractionalization (p < 0.05) and rural population (p < 0.05) all yield 
statistically significant results. The coefficients of these complex interactions are more 
easily conceptualized when viewed graphically.  
Figure 4 depicts the predicted count of protests, as a function of SMI and ethnic 
fractionalization, with all other variables held at their mean value. The blue line 
represents this predicted count of protests at the 95th percentile of ethnic fractionalization 
at the corresponding value for SMI. The confidence interval for that predicted count is 
shown with the blue shaded region. At low levels of SMI, highly fractionalized 
populations experience approximately three protests annually, which increases modestly 
to approximately four at the upper end of SMI. Similarly, the red line denotes the 
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predicted count of protests within populations with low ethnic fractionalization, the 5th 
percentile. The confidence interval is illustrated with the red shaded area. At the lower 
limits of SMI low ethnic fractionalization countries experience, fewer protest than do 
highly fractionalized ones. As SMI increases, however, the count nearly triples from 
under three to over ten protests annually. 
 
Figure 4.  Peaceful Protests by Ethnic Fractionalization as a Function of SMI 
(Model 5) 
The difference between the high and low ethnic fractionalization is statistically 
significant and serves as evidence to refute H5, which predicted that regimes with high 
levels of ethnic fractionalization would experience higher levels of peaceful protest as 
social media penetration increases. The findings within Model 5 and illustrated in Figure 
4 suggest that the protest inducing effect of SMI is actually more pronounced within 
ethnically homogenous populations. Though ethnic homogeneity is not requisite for 
protest, it appears that it largely contributes to the expansion of protests within anocratic 
and autocratic regimes as SMI increases. Although it is not explored within this research, 
an interesting area of further inquiry would be whether ethnic fractionalization leads to 
alternate expressions of violent collective action. 
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Figure 5 was designed specifically to address H4, which predicted that regimes 
with high rural populations would experience greater increases in levels of peaceful 
protest as social media penetration increases. It illustrates the predicted count of protests, 
as a function of SMI and rural population, with all control variables held at their mean 
value. The blue line represents the predicted count of protests for the 80th percentile of 
overall rural population, at the corresponding value for SMI. At low levels of SMI, highly 
rural populations experience just over two protests annually, which almost triples to 
approximately six at high levels of SMI. On the other hand, the red line represents the 
predicted count of protests within populations in the 20th percentile of rural population. 
Populations with a smaller percentage of rural citizens experience a more modest growth 
in protests from three to five. Model 5 appeared to support H4, however the cumulative 
effect of all coefficients when viewed graphically, demonstrates only a modest separation 
in effect between high and low rural populations. It is thus impossible to reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5% confidence level.  
 
Figure 5.  Peaceful Protests by Rural Population as a Function of SMI 
(Model 5) 
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Within Model 5, not only are the interactions between SMI and ethnic 
fractionalization and rural population statistically significant (p < 0.05), but so too is the 
negative interaction relationship between SMI and press restrictions (p <0.01). That is, it 
appears that a restricted, state-censored press inhibits the protest inducing effects of SMI. 
Figure 6 illustrates the cumulative effect of SMI on the interaction between SMI and press 
restrictions. The blue line represents countries with press restriction to a 95% confidence 
interval, as illustrated by the shaded region, ranging from two to six across the SMI 
spectrum. The red line represents countries without press restriction to a 95% confidence 
interval, as illustrated by the shaded region, ranging from almost none to seven across the 
SMI spectrum. Cumulatively, both segments of the population experience increased 
protests, though in countries lacking press restrictions the protest-inducing effect of SMI 
is much stronger.  
 




Although press restrictions are a measure of censorship within mass media, it is 
fair to assume that states that practice censorship will apply the same or similar measures 
to alternate forms of expression. Following this assumption, one might argue that 
censored horizontal ICT is akin to having none at all. Rather than enabling coordination 
and mobilization, censored horizontal SMI becomes an extension of state propaganda and 
a platform to collect intelligence on dissidents. 
Interestingly, the effect of SMI on the rate of protests is most pronounced within 
anocracies, not autocracies, as originally hypothesized. Depending on outcomes and 
perspective, horizontal ICT appears to be, either a destabilizing force in already unstable 
and ineffective states, or an important catalyst for peaceful protests toward 
democratization in states that do not enjoy representative government. As costs 
associated with horizontal ICT infrastructure are reduced, with the perpetual 
advancement of technology, a social media challenge emerges for anocracies. An 
anocratic regime that wishes to maintain the status quo, should work to mitigate, reduce, 
or otherwise eliminate horizontal ICT. However, advances in SMI are often irreversible. 
Even if populations were willing to accept this type of state intervention, anocracies 
undoubtedly lack the capacity to institute it effectively. Though it is worth noting that 
states have an additional option, if they wish to maintain stability, according to the thesis’ 
results, it may be in their best interest to implement democratic reforms.   
An Akaike information criterion (AIC) value is computed with each of this 
study’s negative binomial regression models. The AIC alone is insufficient to determine 
the validity of a model, but is useful in comparing models with lower AIC values 
indicating a better fit to the data. Model 5’s AIC value is the smallest (5,679.005) of all 
models, indicating best fit. As previously asserted, the interactions between and among 
SMI, polity, and control variables are the most predictive to explain the rise in protests 
from 1990–2011. These models, when subjected to the subsequent robustness checks, 
support these findings. 
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B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The principal findings in this study aggregate African and Latin American 
countries together, however the two were run independently as a robustness check of the 
findings. There were few reportable changes between the aggregate dataset and Africa, 
however there is a key reportable shift in statistical significance with the Latin American 
countries. Here, the coefficient for the interaction between SMI and autocracy becomes 
negative and statistically significant, mirroring the pattern seen in full democracies. 
When viewed as a figure, both democracies and autocracies experience static rates of 
protest across the SMI spectrum, while anocracies see exponential growth in protest 
levels in the presence of higher levels of SMI.  
The histories, geographies, politics, and economics of Africa and Latin America 
assuredly contribute distinct differences in expression of collective action. To that end, it 
should come as no surprise that the protest inducing effect of SMI on individual variables 
would have varied results. Most importantly, the protest inducing effect of SMI across all 
polity regime types is that SMI is particularly destabilizing to anocratic regimes lending 
credibility to this study’s findings on the unique relationship between anocratic regimes 
and ICT. 
The primary regression model employs a low threshold (a score of 35 out a 
possible 100) to define press as restricted. That choice was intentional; any amount of 
state meddling in the free flow of information is tantamount to censorship. That threshold 
was substantially raised (to a score of 70 out of a possible 100) as a second robustness 
check. Predictably, the conditioning effect of press restrictions becomes statistically 
insignificant. Additionally, the researchers ran the Internet and cellular data 
independently as a robustness check. The results of the disaggregated cell and Internet 
data are nearly identical to the SMI findings. As a final robustness check, fixed effects for 
unobserved heterogeneity between countries were applied to the primary regression 
models. All of these findings were sufficiently similar to omit from further discussion. 
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C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The regression models offered in this study offer clear evidence that there is an 
association between SMI, political regime type, and the occurrence of protests. Though 
the evidence reported here does not directly support the original hypothesis that 
authoritarian regimes would experience more protests than democracies, it is clear that 
anocracies are particularly vulnerable to the effects of ICT. The findings of this study 
largely support a narrative, which posits that stable polities, whether democratic or 
autocratic, with relatively diverse, urban populations, are less inclined to protest in the 
face of rising ICT numbers. One of the hallmarks of new ICT infrastructure and 
technologies is that they enable an expanded base of users to participate in the popular 
discourse, where they may have previously been left behind with the last generation of 
ICT. Rural centers throughout much of Africa and Latin America, undoubtedly largely 
had less access to mass media technologies and landline telecommunications technology. 
These populations, and their governments, may be ill equipped to the effects of new 
media, because they never experienced, in mass, the normative effects of mass media, 
and its normative effects. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND PROJECTIONS 
Broadly, this research demonstrates that SMI interacts strongly with all regime 
types. Specifically, democratic and autocratic regimes seem more stable in the face of 
growing social media user numbers. Yet, SMI appears to have a unique interaction with 
anocratic regimes, rural states, and ethnically homogenous populations. These 
interactions may prove important to the international community as a whole and more 
importantly to U.S. policy makers. In this section, the thesis will broadly cover those 
findings, provide potential policy implications, and finally offer suggestions for future 
research in this field.  
Democratic regimes seem the least affected by the spread of social media, as they 
experience no significant increase or decrease in peaceful protests. Although the findings 
do not entirely support H3, the data and research do demonstrate that SMI does not 
significantly increase peaceful protest in democracies. Therefore, the hypothesis is 
partially correct in assuming that protest levels would not rise. If citizens have a means to 
express their discontent with their leaders, then social media may just be another form of 
entertainment. Thus, peaceful protests may remain low in an environment where citizens 
believe that their concerns are both heard and fulfilled by the state leadership. Though the 
data does not suggest that peaceful protest may be a precursor to democratization, 
although this would be an interesting topic to investigate, it does portend that 
democracies will experience insignificant increases in peaceful protests as social media 
usage increases. The finding is promising, because it supports the prevailing notion that 
democracies are relatively stable polities.  
Moreover, the thesis found that autocracies are also resistant to social media’s 
effects. At first glance, this appears counterintuitive, and defied initial expectations with 
H1. Autocracies are often described as rigid states that are unable to respond to their 
populace’s grievances or that they often hold positions without democratic elections. 
These complaints may hold true; however, autocracies are cognizant of their 
inadequacies, and they use social media to strengthen their weaknesses. Consequently, 
instead of allowing their populous unfettered access to media, autocracies may restrict 
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personal access to media while simultaneously utilizing social media venues to 
strengthen state apparatuses. Returning to the earlier example, China routinely uses the 
Internet to promote government activities, monitor conversations, and block any outside 
ideas from influencing their citizens. When social media is controlled in this manner, it 
may serve a more similar role as mass media. In essence, autocratic citizens receive the 
news broadcasted by its government, and because of government funded firewalls, rarely 
experience an influx of outside ideas. In autocratic states with strong institutions, 
controlling the media is feasible. However, when a weaker form of government, such as 
anocracy, is faced with similar circumstances, it seems that their instructions may not be 
as resilient.  
Most notably, the data reveal that anocratic states are the most sensitive to social 
media effects on peaceful protest. This suggests that anocratic states have the most 
trouble with maintaining the status quo in the face of new technology. This may be 
caused by their relatively weak institutions, as compared to their more stable 
counterparts, democracies and autocracies. Anocratic states often go to great measures to 
portray outward characteristics of democratic or autocratic states; however, SMI exposes 
their weak institutions, which may eventually induce peaceful protest. Therefore, in order 
to appeal to the portion of the national community interested in democratic reforms, or 
even potential suitors from more autocratic backgrounds, the anocratic state may decide 
to either close their information channels or implement democratic reforms that promote 
information sharing. As such, anocratic regimes face a social media challenge centered 
on either increasing freedoms or increasing restrictions.  
Interestingly, the data suggest that there are ways that anocracies may counteract 
SMI’s destabilizing characteristics. The data reveal that strong electoral institutions, 
whether autocratic or democratic allow states to avoid SMI impacts, but interestingly, the 
thesis also finds that strong media restrictions allow states to avoid these impacts. In 
other words, an anocracy could choose to implement either democratic or autocratic 
reforms to possibly receive similar results. However, if the government decides to 
maintain the status quo, then SMI’s disruptive effects continue to grow as more members 
of the population gains access to social media.  
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This research also lends to the line of thought that high levels of ethnic 
fractionalization are not necessarily disruptive. In fact, the data shows that SMI has its 
most protest inducing effect in those states that have ethnic homogeneity. This may be 
explained by social media’s tendency to reinforce existing relationships and its tendency 
to bring like-minded individuals together under one community umbrella. Therefore, 
protest may be more likely under those groups where people with similar cultural 
backgrounds and upbringings are reinforcing each other’s complaints against their 
government. Under highly fractionalized states, this cohesion is less unlikely, because 
ethnic differences drive the different ethnic groups apart, thus decreasing the likelihood 
for organized peaceful protests. This may demonstrate that social media tends to promote 
isolation, more so, than it does with bringing ethnically different groups together. 
Obviously, a state cannot control its baseline ethnic make-up, but understanding ethnic 
fractionalization may provide insight into how states decide to implement controls on 
media. For instance, states with high ethnic fractionalization may lean toward increasing 
media freedom while states with low ethnic fractionalization may implement more 
restrictive measures on information freedom.  
Furthermore, as the SMI rises in high rural countries, so too do the number of 
peaceful protest. In anocratic regimes concomitant with weak institutions, the rural 
population may be removed from the state building capacity that is often located in urban 
centers. A state’s failure in ability to reach these remote locations may exacerbate their 
citizen’s grievances, and create further disconnect from the government. States, in this 
case, may choose to expand its social media to rural locations, and restrict social media to 
a state-making tool.  
These phenomena lead to key considerations for policy makers. How does the 
United States influence these susceptible states to choose the democratic route? If left to 
develop on its own, the affected country may embark on a path of information restriction, 
possibly closing its information lines with other democracies isolating itself from the 
international community. Once these states achieve a certain level of disruption, they may 
become problematic to their neighbors and possibly the international community. 
Another consideration is that competing world powers are constantly seeking new 
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partners. If the United States ignores these fragile states, its competitors may seize an 
opportunity to expand their influence into the affected country.  
Policy makers must be acutely aware of both the protest-inducing effects of SMI 
on regimes, for horizontal ICT has fundamentally altered human interaction, the world 
over. Recognizing that anocracies are in this delicate balance of power, policy makers 
should place priority in engaging anocratic states, through persistent engagement along 
all diplomatic, information, military, and economic lines of effort. As figure 1 shows, the 
diffusion of these systems will continue to grow. It is, therefore, vital to at least attempt 
to understand the interactions that exist between technology and society.  
This research does not establish a causal relationship between the SMI and 
peaceful protests, but it does indicate a substantial relationship. Though these findings are 
compelling, there are limitations to the research design that would ideally be tested with 
the availability of updated data. Ideally, future inquiry into the relationship between SMI 
and peaceful protest will utilize a global dataset, not constrained to two regions. This 
study ignored the objectives, outcomes, and size of peaceful protests, future iterations 
could parse these details out to better understand the nature of protests, and which ones 
are truly meaningful. Finally, just as not all peaceful protests are equal, not all censorship 
is equal. Though press restrictions attempted to approximate state censorship, future 
inquiry should identify an Internet freedom metric. 
Additionally, this study raises questions that merit empirical analysis in their own 
right. Primarily, this begs the question whether peaceful protest is tantamount to popular 
requests for state democratization. This statement is untested and deserves exploration. Is 
peaceful protest a means to an end, or is it an end unto itself? Similarly, do regimes that 
experience protest, particularly protest in conjunction with autocratic to anocratic 
transition, eventually complete the transition to full democracy? What roles can SMI play 
in that transition? How robust are these transitions if press restrictions can be used to 
suppress peaceful protests? 
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APPENDIX.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Table 2.   Robustness Check, Fixed Effects for Countries67 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SMI  0.238*** 0.337*** 0.179*** 0.796*** 
  (0.048) (0.057) (0.048) (0.115) 
      
GDP 0.283 0.033 0.354 0.375 0.117 
 (0.445) (0.449) (0.443) (0.443) (0.441) 
      
Population 3.729*** -0.486 -1.572 -1.597 1.120 
 (0.696) (1.082) (1.100) (1.087) (1.245) 
      
Ethnic 9.001** -12.435** -14.855** -14.295** -12.806** 
Fractionalization (3.736) (5.751) (5.864) (5.754) (5.848) 
      
Rural 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.083*** 
Population (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
      
Press 0.258* 0.273* 0.164 0.177 0.149 
Restrictions (0.155) (0.154) (0.151) (0.151) (0.154) 
      
Democratization 0.022* 0.014 0.036** 0.024** 0.042*** 
Score (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) 
      
Autocracy   -0.433***  -0.402** 
   (0.166)  (0.164) 
      
Democracy   -0.630***  -0.589*** 
   (0.150)  (0.149) 
      
SMI *     -0.241*** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.076) 
      
SMI *     -0.003** 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
SMI *     -0.206*** 
Press Rest     (0.072) 
      
SMI *   -0.171***  -0.175*** 
Autocracy   (0.056)  (0.056) 
      
SMI *   -0.139***  -0.250*** 
Democracy   (0.047)  (0.054) 
      
Anocracy    0.507***  
    (0.083)  
      
SMI *    0.157***  
Anocracy    (0.041)  
      
Constant -32.508*** 8.670 16.784* 16.204 -4.485 
 (5.550) (9.902) (10.104) (9.978) (11.077) 
      
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Log Likelihood -2,991.257 -2,980.614 -2,954.858 -2,955.398 -2,943.650 
theta 1.398*** (0.085) 1.441*** (0.089) 1.559*** (0.100) 1.558*** (0.100) 1.622*** (0.106) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,108.514 6,089.227 6,045.716 6,042.796 6,029.301 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
                                                 
67 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3.   Robustness Check, Africa68 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SMI  0.101*** 0.151*** 0.033 0.679*** 
  (0.025) (0.033) (0.035) (0.142) 
      
GDP 0.505*** 0.453*** 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.516*** 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) 
      
Population 1.301*** 1.242*** 1.195*** 1.201*** 1.149*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
      
Ethnic -0.360** -0.221 -0.198 -0.191 -0.153 
Fractionalization (0.160) (0.160) (0.164) (0.162) (0.164) 
      
Rural -0.007* -0.004 0.00003 -0.001 0.002 
Population (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
      
Press 0.749*** 0.733*** 0.545*** 0.622*** 0.671*** 
Restrictions (0.145) (0.145) (0.153) (0.150) (0.167) 
      
Democratization 0.020** 0.012 0.050*** 0.018** 0.052*** 
Score (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) 
      
Autocracy   0.113  0.127 
   (0.151)  (0.149) 
      
Democracy   -0.545***  -0.483*** 
   (0.171)  (0.170) 
      
SMI *     -0.295*** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.094) 
      
SMI *     -0.001 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
SMI *     -0.258** 
Press Rest     (0.102) 
      
SMI *   -0.072  -0.082 
Autocracy   (0.058)  (0.058) 
      
SMI *   -0.117**  -0.198*** 
Democracy   (0.058)  (0.070) 
      
Anocracy    0.210**  
    (0.088)  
      
SMI *    0.111**  
Anocracy    (0.046)  
      
Constant -9.316*** -9.017*** -8.964*** -9.304*** -8.827*** 
 (0.825) (0.827) (0.830) (0.828) (0.824) 
      
Observations 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 1,064 
Log Likelihood -2,499.176 -2,491.263 -2,483.027 -2,486.275 -2,474.702 
theta 0.839*** (0.050) 0.857*** (0.051) 0.878*** (0.053) 0.873*** (0.052) 0.903*** (0.055) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,012.352 4,998.527 4,990.053 4,992.550 4,979.404 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
68 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.   Robustness Check, Latin America69 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
SMI  0.130*** 0.798*** 0.064 0.283 
  (0.044) (0.164) (0.048) (0.285) 
      
GDP -0.173 -0.354 0.389 0.039 0.219 
 (0.245) (0.244) (0.279) (0.267) (0.290) 
      
Population 2.187*** 2.132*** 1.546*** 1.875*** 1.820*** 
 (0.203) (0.197) (0.242) (0.225) (0.266) 
      
Ethnic -1.992*** -1.704*** -0.719 -1.181** -0.442 
Fractionalization (0.500) (0.488) (0.517) (0.511) (0.562) 
      
Rural 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.014* 0.023*** 0.001 
Population (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
      
Press -0.268 -0.379* -0.332 -0.261 -0.239 
Restrictions (0.208) (0.209) (0.205) (0.210) (0.210) 
      
Democratization -0.066*** -0.077*** -0.234*** -0.069*** -0.236*** 
Score (0.014) (0.015) (0.054) (0.015) (0.054) 
      
Autocracy   -2.084***  -2.154*** 
   (0.607)  (0.624) 
      
Democracy   0.571*  0.949*** 
   (0.328)  (0.361) 
      
SMI *     -0.605* 
Ethnic Frac     (0.337) 
      
SMI *     0.016*** 
Rural Pop     (0.004) 
      
SMI *     -0.123 
Press Rest     (0.098) 
      
SMI *   -0.547***  -0.281 
Autocracy   (0.205)  (0.234) 
      
SMI *   -0.742***  -0.776*** 
Democracy   (0.178)  (0.186) 
      
Anocracy    0.224  
    (0.217)  
      
SMI *    0.632***  
Anocracy    (0.175)  
      
Constant -13.623*** -12.526*** -9.874*** -12.026*** -10.902*** 
 (1.820) (1.774) (1.962) (1.812) (2.151) 
      
 
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 
Log Likelihood -660.643 -656.811 -644.815 -651.077 -636.313 
theta 1.572*** (0.216) 1.713*** (0.247) 1.921*** (0.282) 1.800*** (0.261) 1.977*** (0.280) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,335.286 1,329.623 1,313.630 1,322.154 1,302.626 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
69 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5.   Robustness Check, Cellular70  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Cell  0.100*** 0.148*** 0.019 0.459*** 
  (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.107) 
      
GDP 0.261** 0.196* 0.351*** 0.371*** 0.310*** 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) 
      
Population 1.299*** 1.242*** 1.210*** 1.211*** 1.204*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
      
Ethnic -0.541*** -0.481*** -0.512*** -0.506*** -0.505*** 
Fractionalization (0.127) (0.126) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
      
Rural -0.006** -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
Population (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Press 0.428*** 0.409*** 0.274** 0.305*** 0.428*** 
Restrictions (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.116) (0.124) 
      
Democratization -0.002 -0.008 0.038*** 0.003 0.035** 
Score (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) 
      
Autocracy   -0.015  -0.028 
   (0.147)  (0.146) 
      
Democracy   -0.712***  -0.578*** 
   (0.146)  (0.147) 
      
Cell *     -0.199*** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.076) 
      
Cell *     0.002 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
Cell *     -0.290*** 
Press Rest     (0.073) 
      
Cell *   -0.073  -0.099* 
Autocracy   (0.055)  (0.056) 
      
Cell *   -0.134***  -0.270*** 
Democracy   (0.047)  (0.057) 
      
Anocracy    0.393***  
    (0.080)  
      
Cell *    0.121***  
Anocracy    (0.041)  
      
Constant -8.264*** -7.776*** -7.862*** -8.344*** -7.811*** 
 (0.718) (0.719) (0.714) (0.714) (0.708) 
      
 
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Log Likelihood -3,213.621 -3,203.307 -3,183.721 -3,187.952 -3,173.318 
theta 0.831*** (0.043) 0.851*** (0.044) 0.890*** (0.047) 0.884*** (0.047) 0.912*** (0.048) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,441.242 6,422.614 6,391.443 6,395.904 6,376.637 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
70 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.   Robustness Check, Internet71  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Internet  0.162*** 0.230*** 0.070** 0.547*** 
  (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.112) 
      
GDP 0.261** 0.138 0.304*** 0.323*** 0.278** 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
      
Population 1.299*** 1.214*** 1.189*** 1.182*** 1.201*** 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
      
Ethnic -0.541*** -0.409*** -0.416*** -0.427*** -0.546*** 
Fractionalization (0.127) (0.126) (0.129) (0.128) (0.135) 
      
Rural -0.006** -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
Population (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Press 0.428*** 0.399*** 0.264** 0.301*** 0.218* 
Restrictions (0.115) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) 
      
Democratization -0.002 -0.009 0.040*** 0.0001 0.038*** 
Score (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) 
      
Autocracy   0.009  -0.015 
   (0.154)  (0.153) 
      
Democracy   -0.825***  -0.794*** 
   (0.146)  (0.146) 
      
Internet *     -0.209** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.086) 
      
Internet *     0.001 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
Internet *     -0.284*** 
Press Rest     (0.076) 
      
Internet *   -0.075  -0.089 
Autocracy   (0.061)  (0.061) 
      
Internet *   -0.187***  -0.331*** 
Democracy   (0.052)  (0.065) 
      
Anocracy    0.455***  
    (0.085)  
      
Internet *    0.151***  
Anocracy    (0.046)  
      
Constant -8.264*** -7.347*** -7.494*** -7.982*** -7.407*** 
 (0.718) (0.718) (0.712) (0.713) (0.708) 
      
 
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Log Likelihood -3,213.621 -3,193.186 -3,172.002 -3,177.916 -3,162.309 
theta 0.831*** (0.043) 0.869*** (0.045) 0.913*** (0.048) 0.904*** (0.048) 0.933*** (0.050) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,441.242 6,402.371 6,368.003 6,375.832 6,354.617 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
71 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7.   Robustness Check, Alternate Press Restriction Threshold72  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
SMI  0.124*** 0.182*** 0.035 0.251*** 
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.085) 
      
GDP 0.128 0.060 0.272** 0.287*** 0.267** 
 (0.106) (0.104) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) 
      
Population 1.339*** 1.278*** 1.239*** 1.236*** 1.238*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
      
Ethnic -0.553*** -0.463*** -0.480*** -0.488*** -0.409*** 
Fractionalization (0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.129) (0.132) 
      
Rural -0.007*** -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Population (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Press 0.101 0.133 0.143 0.148* 0.140 
Restrictions (0.090) (0.090) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
      
Democratization -0.010 -0.015** 0.038*** -0.0003 0.039*** 
Score (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) 
      
Autocracy   0.028  0.038 
   (0.142)  (0.141) 
      
Democracy   -0.719***  -0.677*** 
   (0.145)  (0.144) 
      
SMI *     -0.201*** 
Ethnic Frac     (0.077) 
      
SMI *     0.001 
Rural Pop     (0.001) 
      
SMI *     0.018 
Press Rest     (0.048) 
      
SMI *   -0.069  -0.090 
Autocracy   (0.054)  (0.057) 
      
SMI *   -0.169***  -0.191*** 
Democracy   (0.047)  (0.053) 
      
Anocracy    0.393***  
    (0.078)  
      
SMI *    0.140***  
Anocracy    (0.041)  
      
Constant -7.702*** -7.271*** -7.655*** -8.053*** -7.699*** 
 (0.713) (0.707) (0.700) (0.704) (0.699) 
      
 
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Log Likelihood -3,219.423 -3,204.414 -3,180.346 -3,186.055 -3,176.602 
theta 0.825*** (0.042) 0.852*** (0.044) 0.899*** (0.048) 0.891*** (0.047) 0.909*** (0.048) 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,452.846 6,424.829 6,384.693 6,392.109 6,383.205 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
                                                 
72 Coefficients from negative binomial regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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